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Comments
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS
The United States Supreme Court cases of Shelley v. Krae-
mer' and Hurd v. Hodge2 are companion cases that effected a
reversal in what generally had been conceived to be the law as
to restrictive covenants forbidding the sale or use of real prop-
erty to certain racial groups. Both cases involved similar agree-
1. 68 S.Ct. 836 (U. S. 1948).
2. 68 S.Ct. 847 (U. S. 1948).
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ments along the familiar line, the Shelley case arising in a state
and the Hurd case in the District of Columbia. The property
owners of the vicinity had signed an agreement designed to pre-
vent ownership or occupancy of any of the property by "any
person not of the Caucasian race" in the state case and by "any
Negro or colored person" in the District of Columbia case. In
each case a sale was made to a Negro, and the other property
owners sued to enforce the agreement. In the Shelley case the
Supreme Court held that judicial enforcement of such restrictive
covenants amounted to state action violating the equal protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In the Hurd case, the
constitutional question of due process under the Fifth Amend-
ment was not decided. Judicial enforcement of the restrictive
covenants was denied on the ground that it was prohibited by
the Civil Rights Act of 1866. 3 The District of Columbia is in-
cluded within the meaning of the term "every State and Terri-
tory,"4 in Section 1978 of the Revised Statutes:
"All citizens of the United States shall have the same
right, in every State and Territory, as is enjoyed by white
citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and
convey real and personal property."5
These decisions simply state that the courts may not enforce
the so-called restrictive covenants based on racial grounds wher-
ever they may arise, but such agreements, however, are not
invalid per se. As long as their purpose is achieved privately
through voluntary adherence to their terms, there can be no
court interference for there is no governmental action to invoke
the Fourteenth Amendment and legislation enacted to effect its
purposes.
The Court had no difficulty in distinguishing Corrigan v.
Buckley,' previously thought to be authority for the enforce-
3. 14 Stat. 27, 8 U.S.C.A. § 42 (1866). The Civil Rights Act of 1866 was
re-enacted in Section 18 of the Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 144, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 41 (1870).
4. Cf. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 10 S.Ct. 295, 33 L.Ed. 642 (1890);
Talbott v. Silver Bow County, 139 U. S. 438, 444, 11 S.Ct. 594, 596, 35 L.Ed.
210 (1891).
5. 14 Stat. 27, U.S.C.A. § 42 (1866).
6. 271 U. S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969 (1926). The court also dis-
tinguished Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U. S. 32, 61 S.Ct. 115, 85 LEd. 22 (1940).
Here again the issue did not arise as to whether judicial enforcement of the
covenant amounted to state action. The case held that the petitioners, who
were suing to enforce the restrictive covenant, would be deprived of prop-
erty without due process of law if they were held bound by an erroneous




ability as well as the legality of such covenants. 7 In that case,
where there was a restrictive covenant not to sell to Negroes
for a period of twenty-one years, the Supreme Court refused to
take jurisdiction as there was no substantial constitutional ques-
tion, the appeal being based solely on the contention that the
covenant itself was void because it violated the Fifth, Thirteenth
and Fourteenth Amendments and the Civil Rights Act. The case,
arising in the District of Columbia, could not conceivably be
authority for the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment
is not violated by such covenants being judicially enforced, as
that amendment applies only to states. Whether or not judicial
enforcement amounted to state action was left undecided, for
that question had not been raised by the petition for the appeal
or by any assignment of error. On a jurisdictional point, there-
fore, the appeal was dismissed.8 Thus the Corrigan case decided
only that these covenants in and of themselves do not violate
the constitutional mandate and is not authority for the propo-
sition that such a covenant is both valid and enforceable by
injunction, although such covenants have been enforced on its
authorityY The latter question had never been properly raised
before the Supreme Court prior to the instant cases.
Ordinances and statutes designed to prevent Negroes from
acquiring and using particular property have always been held
invalid as they are too obviously prohibited by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and attempts to justify them as a lawful exercise
of the police power to prevent conflict and ill feeling between
the races have failed. 10
7. See McGovney, Racial Residential Segregation by State Court En-forcement of Restrictive Agreements, Covenants, or Conditions in Deeds
is Unconstitutional (1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5. In Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.(2d)
233, 235 (App. D.C. 1947), speaking of the Corrigan case, Justice Edgerton,
dissenting, said: "Accordingly it decided nothing with regard to racial re-
strictive covenants except that the Constitution and the Civil Rights Actplainly do not make them void." See also Mays v. Burgess, 79 App. D.C. 343,349, 147 F.(2d) 869, 162 A.L.R. 168 (1945), certiorari denied 325 U. S. 868, 65
S.Ct. 1406, 89 L.Ed. 1987 (1945), rehearing denied 325 U.S. 896, 65 S.Ct. 1567, 89
L.Ed. 2006 (1945).
8. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 331, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969 (1926).9. Similar restrictive covenants have been upheld by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Torrey v. Wolfes, 56 App.
D.C. 4, 6 F.(2d) 702 (1925); Cornish v. O'Donoghue, 58 App. D.C. 359, 30 F.(2d)983 (1929), cert. denied 279 U.S. 871, 49 S.Ct. 512, 73 L.Ed. 1007 (1929); Russell
v. Wallace, 58 App. D.C. 357, 30 F.(2d) 981 (1929), cert. denied 278 U.S. 871,49 S.Ct. 512, 73 L.Ed. 1007 (1929); Grady v. Garland, 67 App. D.C. 73, 89 F.(2d)
817 (1937), cert. denied 302 U.S. 694, 58 S.Ct. 13, 82 L.Ed. 536 (1937); Hundley v.
Gorewitz, 77 App. D.C. 48, 132 F.(2d) 23 (1942); Mays v. Burgess, 79 App.
D.C. 343, 147 F.(2d) 869, 162 A.L.R. 168 (1945), cert. denied 325 U.S. 868, 65S.Ct. 1406, 89 L.Ed. 1987 (1945), rehearing denied 325 U.S. 896, 65 S.Ct. 1567,
89 L.Ed. 2006 (1945).
10. Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38 S.Ct. 16, 62 L.Ed. 149, L.R.A.
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In Louisiana the general rule is that building and use re-
striction clauses constitute real rights, not personal to the vendor,
running with the land for the benefit of all other grantees under
a general plan of development. The remedy of other grantees is
by injunction to prevent a violation." This rule remains, of
course, unaffected except as to the enforceability of racially
restrictive covenants. The Louisiana decision of Queensborough
Land Company v. Cazeaux,1 2 was the first in the United States
holding that a restraint against the sale to any Negro was legal
and enforceable. It distinguished between local and perpetual
inalienability as compared with partial and temporary inalien-
ability holding the latter valid and enforceable, the covenant in
the case being for twenty-five years. The question as to judicial
enforcement of the covenant amounting to state action was not
raised. However, Justice Provosty, speaking for the court, said:
"The fourteenth amendment, in so far as prohibiting
discrimination against the negro race, applies only to state
legislation, not to the contracts of individuals. Civil Rights
Cases, 109 U.S. 62, 3 Sup. Ct. 18, 27 L. Ed. 835.' 1 3
Had a broader view been taken as to what constituted state ac-
tion, the decision might not have been reached so easily. In view
of the instant cases, the Louisiana Supreme Court can no longer
enforce a restrictive covenant based on race or color alone, de-
spite the fact that such covenants have been held to constitute
a dismemberment of ownership in the nature of a servitude and
1918C 210, Ann. Cas. 1918A 1201 (1917). Harmon v. Tyler, 273 U.S. 668, 47
S.Ct. 471, 71 L.Ed. 831 (1927); City of Richmond v. Deans, 281 U.S. 704, 50
S.Ct. 407, 74 LEd. 1128 (1930).
Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269, 92 L.Ed. 257 (1948), de-
clared a state law denying equal enjoyment of property rights to a certain
racial group was not a legitimate exercise of the state's police power.
11. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A.
1916B 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D 1248 (1915); Hill v. Win. P. Ross, Inc., 166 La.
581, 117 So. 725 (1928); Ouachita Home Site & Realty Co. v. Collie, 189 La.
521, 179 So. 841 (1938).
Louisiana courts have treated a restriction not to sell to a negro as a
dismemberment of ownership operating as a servitude on the land. The right
to alienate (abusus) has been held to be subdivided and only partially trans-
ferred to the new owner, there being withheld from him that part which
would enable him to sell to a negro.
Art. 709, La. Civil Code of 1870, states: "Owners have a right to estab-
lish on their estates, or in favor of their estates, such servitudes as they
deem proper; provided, nevertheless, that the services be not imposed on
the person or in favor of the person, but only on an estate or in favor of an
estate; and provided, moreover, that such services imply nothing contrary
to public order."
12. 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641, L.R.A. 1916B 1201, Ann. Cas. 1916D 1248 (1915).
13. 136 La. 724, 728, 67 So. 641, 643.
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their breach to effect a resolutory condition or condition subse-
quent in the contract. 14
Employment of state action to enforce any agreement or
arrangement (whatever it may be called) denying essential civil
rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment is now forbidden.
The extent to which any system that might involve racial discrim-
ination as to property rights will be scrutinized is indicated by
the case of Harmon v. Tyler,15 where the United States Supreme
Court held unconstitutional a New Orleans ordinance which
barred whites or Negroes from any portion of the city except
on the written approval of a majority of the persons of the oppo-
site race inhabiting that particular portion of the city. This
decision indicates that a discrimination is nonetheless invalid
though counterbalanced by another of similar character. 6
The decision in the Shelley and Hurd cases came as no sur-
prise to many,1 7 since it has long been settled that not only legis-
lation and procedure, but judicially adopted rules of substantive
law are invalid if they conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment. 8
Taking the premise that the courts cannot validly do that which
is forbidden the legislature, and thus refusing to construe nar-
14. Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915).
15. 273 U.S. 668, 47 S.Ct. 471, 71 L.Ed. 831 (1927).
16. Cases from other states upholding similar covenants are Wyatt v.
Adair, 215 Ala. 365, 110 So. 801 (1926); Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary,
181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596, 9 A.L.R. 115 (1919); Wayt v. Patee, 205 Cal. 46,
269 Pac. 660 (1928); Littlejohns v. Henderson, 111 Cal. App. 115, 295 Pac. 95
(1931); Chandler v. Ziegler, 88 Colo. 1, 291 Pac. 822 (1930); Stewart v. Cronan,
105 Colo. 393, 98 P.(2d) 999 (1940); Meade v. Denistone, 173 Md. 295, 196 Atl.
330 (1938); Parmalee v. Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N.W. 330, 38 A.L.R. 1181
(1922); Shulte v. Starks, 238 Mich. 102, 213 N.W. 102 (1927); Koehler v. Row-
land, 275 Mo. 573, 205 S.W. 217, 9 A.L.R. 107 (1918); Porter v. Johnson, 232
Mo. App. 1150, 115 S.W.(2d) 529 (1938); Thornhill v. Herdt, 130 S.W.(2d) 175
(Mo. App. 1939); Porter v. Pryor, 164 S.W.(2d) 175 (Mo. App. 1942); Lyons
v. Walden, 191 Okla. 567, 133 P.(2d) 555 (1942); Doherty v. Rice, 240 Wis.
389, 3 N.W.(2d) 734 (1942); Ridgeway v. Cockburn, 163 Misc. 511, 296 N.Y.
Supp. 936 (1937).
17. Hurd v. Hodge, 162 F.(2d) 233, 235 (App. D.C. 1947) (dissent), noted
in (1945) 33 Calif. L. Rev. 5.
18. Ex parte Commonwealth of Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347, 25 L.Ed. 676
(1880); Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883); Twining
v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 29 S.Ct. 14, 53 L.Ed. 97 (1908); Brinkerhoff-Faris
Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 50 S.Ct. 451, 74 L.Ed. 1107 (1930);
Powell v. State of Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 S.Ct. 55, 77 L.Ed. 158, 84 A.L.R.
527 (1932); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213,
128 A.L.R. 1352 (1940); A. F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321, 61 S.Ct. 568, 85 L.Ed.
855 (1941); Bridges v. State of California, 314 U.S. 252, 62 S.Ct. 190, 86 L.Ed.
192; Bakery and Pastry Drivers and Helpers Local 802 of International
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 62 S.Ct. 816, 86 LEd. 1178
(1942); Cafeteria Employees Union v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 64 S.Ct. 126, 88
L.Ed. 58 (1943); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 66 S.Ct. 1029, 90 L.Ed.
1295 (1946). Cf. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188,
144 A.L.R. 1487 (1938).
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rowly the constitutionally guaranteed civil rights, a federal
district court in California, in Gandolfo v. Hartman,19 has re-
fused to enforce a restrictive covenant against transfers to Chi-
nese. The Civil Rights cases 20 had held that the Fourteenth
Amendment applies to the action of state officers, executive or
judicial, and to state laws and acts done under state authority,
thus, the obvious proposition that the state may not, by any of
its agencies, violate the Fourteenth Amendment.21 The present
decisions mark only one more step in the Supreme Court's efforts
to validate the proposition stated in Strauder v. West Virginia,2
that a state may not make the enjoyment of any civil right de-
pendent upon race or color, and that all persons, whether colored
or white, shall stand equal before the laws of the states. Espe-
cially included as a protected civil right is equality in the enjoy-
ment of property, which was first seen as a prerequisite to other
basic civil liberties in the Slaughter-House cases.23 The decisions
were no doubt influenced by the social interest in adequate Negro
housing and the current national policy to eradicate all racial
discrimination in order to accomplish a higher standard of living
for the Negro. Their efficacy toward those ends remains to be
seen.
24
The difficulty of finding a constitutional basis for holding
that such a restrictive covenant was void in and of itself was
perhaps one reason the court did not disturb its holding in the
Corrigan case,2 5 but the result leaves such covenants in a twi-
light zone, not void but not legally enforceable. Yet in the Hurd
case, it was indicated that even had there been no statute, en-
forcement of such covenants in a federal court would be held
contrary to the public policy of the United States, 26 again indica-
tive of federal policy on all points involving racial issues. Future
manifestations of this trend will be interesting, especially in the
light of the existing acceptance of the principle set up by Plessy
v. Ferguson27 that segregation is valid so long as facilities are sub-
stantially equal.
STUART D. LUNN
19. 49 Fed. 181, 16 L.R.A. 277 (S. D. Calif. 1892).
20. 109 U.S. 3, 3 S.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883).
21. Many decisions but especially Commonwealth of Virginia v. Rives,
100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 667 (1880).
22. 100 U.S. 313, 25 L.Ed. 664 (1880).
23. 83 U.S. 36, 21 LEd. 394 (1873).
24. See Hurd v. Hodge, 161 F.(2d) 233, 235 (App. D.C. 1947)(dissent).
25. 271 U.S. 323, 46 S.Ct. 521, 70 L.Ed. 969 (1926).
26. 68 S.Ct. 847, 853 (U.S. 1948).
27. 163 U.S. 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, 41 L.Ed. 256 (1896). But see Taft, C. J., in
Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78, 48 S.Ct. 91, 72 L.Ed. 172 (1927).
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